


UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.



PANACEA: AUTOMATING ATTACK CLASSIFICATION FOR ANOMALY-BASED NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

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10+ YEARS OF RESEARCH OVER ANOMALY DETECTION...

- Sadly though, few commercial implementations
 - most of them use “behavioral-based” anomaly detection → catchy words to say they detect portscans and DDoS...
 - others promise “protocol-based” anomaly detection → only a few HTTP attacks will use “Content-Length: -1”...

- What went wrong? Where is the anomaly-based Snort ?





IT'S A HARD LIFE IN THE REAL WORLD FOR AN ANOMALY-BASED IDS...

- Training sets are not “clean by default”
- Threshed values must be manually set
- Monitored systems “tend” to change over time
- Alerts must be manually classified

next presentations
in this session



lack of usability → nobody will deploy such an IDS





WHY ALERT CLASSIFICATION SHOULD BE AUTOMATED?

- Use alert correlation/verification and attack trees techniques
 - so far, only available for signature-based IDSs

- Automatic countermeasures activated based on attack classification/impact
 - block the source IP in case of a buffer overflow
 - wait the next action in case of a path traversal

- Reduce the required user knowledge and workload
 - less knowledge and workload → less €€€





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AUTOMATIC ATTACK CLASSIFICATION

➤ Idea:

- attacks in the same class share some common content

➤ Goals:


- effective
 - ✓ > 75% of correct classifications, with no human intervention
- flexible
 - ✓ allow both automatic and manual alert classification in training mode
 - ✓ allow pre- and user-defined attack classes
 - ✓ allow users to tweak the alert classification model





PANACEA


INTERNALS





ALERT INFORMATION EXTRACTOR

- Uses a Bloom filter to store occurrences of n-grams
 - data are sparse, few collisions
 - can handle N-grams ($N \gg 3$)
- Stores thousands of alerts, for “batch training”



+ ALERT CLASSIFICATION
(manually or automatically
provided)





ATTACK CLASSIFICATION ENGINE

- Two different classification algorithms
 - non-incremental learning, more accurate than incremental ones
 - ✓ incremental learning is “simulated” by using batch training
 - process 3000 alerts in less than 40s
 - each bit of the BF is an analysis dimension

- Support Vector Machine (SVM)
 - black box, users have a few “tweak” points

- RIPPER
 - generates human-readable rules





BENCHMARKS

AUTOMATIC MODE - DATASET A

- 3000+ Snort alerts
 - pre-defined alert classes (10)
 - alerts generated by Nessus and a proprietary VA tool
 - no manual classification
 - cross-folding validation

Attack Class	SVM			RIPPER		
	# of samples			# of samples		
	1000	2000	3000	1000	2000	3000
attempted-recon	90.9%	90.5%	90.7%	90.4%	93.9%	94.0%
web-application-attack	79.8%	89.0%	88.8%	97.4%	98.8%	99.1%
web-application-activity	80.8%	81.2%	80.9%	93.7%	96.1%	95.8%





BENCHMARKS

MANUAL MODE - DATASET B

- 1500+ Snort web alerts
 - alerts generated by Nessus, Nikto and Milw0rm attacks
 - attacks are manually classified (WASC taxonomy)
 - cross-folding validation

Attack Class	SVM	RIPPER
Path Traversal	98.6%	99.1%
Cross-site Scripting	97.5%	98.4%
SQL Injection	97.6%	96.2%
Buffer Overflow	37.5%	37.5%
Percentage of total attacks correctly classified	98.0%	97.7%





BENCHMARKS

MANUAL MODE - DATASET C

- Training set:
 - Dataset B
- Testing set: 100 anomaly-based alerts
 - alerts have been captured in the wild by our POSEIDON (analyzes packet payloads) and Sphinx (analyzes web requests)

Attack Class	SVM	RIPPER
Path Traversal	98.1%	94.4%
Cross-site Scripting	92.6%	88.9%
SQL Injection	100.0%	87.5%
Buffer Overflow	50.0% (75.0%)	25.0% (50.0%)
Percentage of total attacks correctly classified	92.0% (93.0%)	89.0% (91.0%)





BENCHMARKS

SUMMARY

- SVM performs better than RIPPER on a class with few samples (~50)
- RIPPER performs better than SVM on a class with a sufficient number of samples (~70)
- SVM performs better than RIPPER on a class with a high intra-class diversity and when attack payloads have not been observed during training





CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

- Panacea fulfills our goals
 - however, it works only in combination with payload-based NIDSs

- Panacea 2.0
 - improved classification
 - ✓ a 2nd order polynomial for SVM increases accuracy to 99% but is x50 slower!
 - ✓ combining SVM and RIPPER when training samples are scarce
 - apply to alert verification
 - ✓ non-relevant true positives and false positives





QUESTIONS

